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Abstract 
 
Carbon leakage in this pape ris the phenomenon whereby Electricity Intensive Industries subject to 
harsh environmental standards move their activity or part of it to more environmentally lenient regions. 
Carbon leakage has been mentioned as a possible outcome of the EU Emission Trading Scheme. 
Different studies are underway to assess the reality of the phenomenon and to devise policies to 
mitigate its possible impact. One remedy, proposed by the Energy Intensive Industries is to combine 
free emission allowances with a pricing of electricity whereby energy émissions and transmission costs 
are bundled and sold on an average cost basis. The paper attempts to model this proposal. 
 We cast the problem in a spatial model of the power sector where generators can develop new 
capacities, the transmission system is organized on a flowgate basis, emission allowances are auctioned, 
except possibly for industries, and traded. The consumer market is decomposed in two segments. 
Industries purchase electricity according to some form of average cost price, the rest of the market is 
supplied at marginal cost. These equilibrium models are non convex. We present the models and 
discuss their properties. Companion papers report policy implications. 
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses a relatively unexplored subject in the literature of electricity restruc-
turing. We consider the question of investing in new generation capacities in a market where
sales are subject to two different price regimes. A fraction of the consumer market pro-
cures electricity through long-term contracts at average cost based price; the other fraction
is supplied at marginal cost price. Physical arbitrage between the two market segments is
impossible. Generators invest to satisfy both segments of the market. The problem is in-
spired by a persistent problem in the European restructured electricity market, which has
recently become more acute with the introduction of carbon trade (Emission Trading Scheme
or ETS). Large industrial consumers, in particular energy intensive industries (EIIs), desire
long-term contracts at prices that are independent of short-term movements of the spot mar-
ket (Businesseurope [1]). They object to procuring the bulk of their electricity at prices
driven by power exchanges (PX). At the same time the whole history of the restructuring of
the power sector has revealed the importance of the short-term market to send correct price
signals and guarantee the good functioning of the market. It is thus essential to retain a sig-
nificant fraction of the market operating on the basis of short-term prices. The introduction
of carbon trading in Europe gave a new impetus to EIIs’ demand. Carbon is an additional
risk factor that affects both the price of allowances and of electricity. EIIs, which did not
like the price volatility created by restructuring, find additional reason to complain because
of this additional carbon driven price volatility.
The quest of the EIIs suggests an easy response. Financial instruments allow one to hedge
electricity and carbon price risks, at least in principle. There is thus no need for long-term
contracts directly negotiated with generators. But EIIs do not trust prices derived from
power exchanges by virtue of the sole financial arbitrage. They do their own computations
and come with costs for base load supplies that they compare to the prices that they get
on the market. They conclude that they would be better off with a long term cost based
contract. This raises the interesting methodological question as to why averages of short-term
prices, such as determined on power exchanges, would differ from the average generation cost
computed by EIIs. The old theory of peak load pricing in optimally adjusted generation
systems suggests that they should not. But even removing this argument would not help;
an investor cannot today secure a long-term financial contract to guarantee the price of its
power supply because the market does not trade long-term risks. Even if possibly justifiable
in theory because of equality between short and long term marginal costs, the sole recourse
to the power exchange would not work in practice.
We treat the question with techniques directly inspired from standard electricity modelling
that we adapt to accommodate the average cost prices demanded by EIIs. We extend existing
models to tackle these dual markets and cast the extended model in an investment context.
Investment models of restructured systems are still unusual and we believe that the one
presented here is novel. Our treatment attempts to reflect some important features of the
European situation: notwithstanding the claim for an internal electricity market, energy
policies remain quite different among Member States in Europe, especially when it comes
to nuclear investments. We thus cast the problem in a spatial set up where different zones
are subject to different restrictions on generation. This raises the question of the geographic
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coverage of the average cost contracts demanded by EIIs: should they be zonal or regional (a
single price for all zones)? Power Exchanges prices differ by the location of the PX, but EIIs
have sometimes demanded a single electricity price throughout Europe. Also average cost
demands a careful definition and verifiability of costs and these also depend on the location.
We believe that these questions have not been addressed yet in the modeling of restructured
electricity systems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general description of the power
market studied and the model implemented. Section 3 presents in details a reference model
whose mathematical features are discussed in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 are respectively
devoted to the presentation of the average cost based models and their mathematical char-
acteristics. Both Sections 3 and 5 model only the additional electricity cost induced by the
ETS. A more general framework is presented in Section 7. In Section 8 we describe our results
from a mathematical point of view and, finally, we report our conclusions in Section 9.
2 Market Description and Modeling Steps
We consider a spatial power market segmented into different zones linked by flowgates. Gen-
erators operate a set of technologies in each zone. There are two types of consumers in each
zone, namely Energy Intensive Industries (EIIs) and other consumers (N-EIIs). They differ
by the flexibility of their demand. EIIs can more or less easily relocate their activities in other
parts of the world in response to changes of electricity and carbon prices: their electricity
demand is thus more flexible than the one of other consumers. The grid is represented as
a set of flowgates under the control of a single system operator (the current organization of
the European grid is more primitive than this flowgate model). We adopt a standard tech-
nological representation of generation plants. Each technology is described by its investment
and operations costs as well as by its conversion efficiency and emission factors. There are
existing capacities, but generators can also invest in new capacities. Because of lack of an
adequate technological information and relevant data, the demand sectors are represented by
linear demand curves. Apart from some recent studies (see Hidalgo et al. [3], Reinaud [7], [8]
and Szabo` et al. [9]), little information is indeed available on the reaction of these sectors to
carbon and electricity prices. We suppose throughout that agents are price takers. All these
are standard assumptions in electricity systems modeling.
EIIs incur direct and indirect ETS driven costs. Electricity prices increase because they
cumulate allowance and fuel costs: this is the indirect cost. EIIs also incur direct costs
because of their emissions; they depend on the allowances that they receive free. We want
to analyze both these indirect electricity and direct carbon costs. We begin with a reference
model presented in Section 3. This model describes a perfectly competitive market where all
agents maximize their benefits. Specifically, generators maximize the profits accruing from
supplying the two consumer groups. Investors optimize the profits derived from investing in
new plants and leasing existing and new capacities to generators. The TSO maximize the
profits from selling flowgate services. Finally, consumers maximize their surpluses. We then
modify this model by segmenting the market and introducing different pricing schemes for
the two consumer groups. This new model is described in Section 5. It supposes that EIIs
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buy electricity at average cost thanks to special long-term contracts while N-EIIs still pay a
marginal cost based electricity price. This implies a change of generators’ behavior, which still
maximize the profits from supplying N-EIIs, but minimize the cost of producing electricity
for EIIs. We consider two average cost pricing systems: one applies a single regional price
to all EII customers. The other applies a different average cost price to the EIIs in each
zone. These two models focus on the sole power sector and assume an emission market
restricted to the electricity sector without trade with the EIIs. We relax this simplifying
assumption in the third part of the analysis presented in Section 7. We there assume that
industries participate to the ETS and are also directly affected by the carbon cost due to
their emissions. This makes the model more realistic, but implies some changes. We first
slightly modify the emission constraint by including the EIIs. The most significant change
concerns the EIIs’ demand function. We assume that the industrial electricity consumption
depends on two prices: the electricity price that can be either marginal or average cost based,
and the carbon cost expressing the EIIs’ position with respect to the emission market. The
update of the ETS legislation indeed leaves it for later to decide whether EIIs would receive
free allowances in the period 2013-2020 and hence what their position will be on that market.
We model both the cases with and without free allowances for EIIs. In the first case, we
suppose a benchmarking method where free allowances are granted proportionally to output
(but not to emissions) to EIIs.
3 The Reference Model
The reference model concentrates on the sole indirect ETS induced cost that results from
higher electricity prices. The model involves three commodity or service markets: energy,
allowances and transmission. Generators, the TSO and two consumer groups operate on some
or all of these markets. In order to simplify the discussion, the electricity demand is only
decomposed into two time segments, peak and off peak. We assume that EIIs’ consumption
is constant over the year, that is in these two time segments. Prices are equal to the marginal
cost. Investors can build new capacities in stage 0; they lease both new and old capacities
to generators in stage 1. Because the model is formulated and solved by mathematical
programming techniques it is rather flexible and can be extended easily.
3.1 Notation of the Reference Model
Following Stoft [6], we conduct the whole discussion on an hourly basis or in MWh. We thus
express capacities in MWh and not in MW.
3.1.1 Notation
• Sets
i ∈ I Zones;
f ∈ F Generators;
4
l ∈ L Flowgates;
t ∈ T Time segments in stage 1;
k ∈ K Technology;
• Parameters
Xf,i,k Existing generation capacity of technology k run by generator f lo-
cated in zone i (MWh);
If,i,k Unitary investment/capacity costs of technology k run by generator
f , in zone i (e/MWh);
cf,i,k Production costs of technology k owned by generator f in zone i
(e/MWh);
τt Duration in % of time segment t;
a1i Intercept of EIIs’ demand function in zone i (e/MWh);
b1i Slope of EIIs’ demand function in zone i (e/MWh
2);
a2i,t Intercept of N-EIIs’ demand function in zone i, time segment t
(e/MWh);
b2i,t Slope of N-EIIs’ demand function in zone i, time segment t
(e/MWh2);
Linecapl Capacity of flowgate l (MWh);
PTDFi,l Flow in flowgate l due to a unit injection in zone i with corresponding
withdrawal at the hub;
ek Emission factor by technology k (ton/MWh);
E Emission cap in ton per hour.
• Variables:
xf,i,k New capacity of technology k used by generator f located in zone i
(MWh);
yf,i,k,t Production of generator f by technology k, located in zone i, time
segment t (MWh);
P 1(d1i , i) EIIs’ annual inverse demand function in zone i (e/MWh);
P 2(d2i,t, i, t) N-EIIs’ annual inverse demand function in zone i, time segment t
(e/MWh);
d1i EIIs’ demand in zone i (MWh);
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d2i,t N-EIIs’ demand in zone i, time segment t (MWh);
pit Electricity price at the hub in time segment t (e/MWh);
pi,t Marginal electricity price in zone i, time segment t (e/MWh);
µ+,−l,t Congestion rent of flowgate l, depending on flow direction (+,−) and
time segment t (e/MWh);
νf,i,k,t Marginal hourly value of capacity (scarcity rent) of technology k used
by generator f in zone i, time segment t (e/MWh).
Note that some variables depend on time t and others do not. As argued before, we
assume that EIIs’ electricity consumption is constant over the year and hence their demand
does not depend on time segment t. We express the inverted demand functions (price as
function of quantities) in the form P 2i,t(d
2
i,t) = a
2
i,t− b2i,td2i,t for N-EIIs and P 1i (d1i ) = a1i − b1i d1i
for EIIs.
3.2 Agents’ Models
3.2.1 Transmission market and TSO’s profit maximization.
We adopt a flowgate representation of the transmission system of the whole region and assume
that the TSO maximizes the gains accruing from selling transmission services compatible with
the network capacity. The PTDF matrix determines the flow through flowgate l resulting
from a unit injection in zone i and withdrawal at the hub. Network constraints impose that
the flow in a flowgate does not exceed its capacity (Linecapl). This must hold for every time
segment. Assuming no losses,
∑
k y
t
i,k,t and (d
1
i + d
2
i,t) are respectively the energy injection
and withdrawal services. The TSO’s maximization problem in each time segment t is then
as follows:
Max
∑
i
pi,t · (d1i + d2i,t −
∑
f,k
yf,i,k,t) s.t. (1)
−Linecapl ≤
∑
i
PTDFi,l(
∑
f,k
yf,i,k,t − d1i − d2i,t) ≤ Linecapl (µ±l,t) ∀ l, t (2)
Note that µ+l,t and µ
−
l,t are the dual variables of the upper and lower transmission con-
straints respectively, while pi,t is the zonal electricity price. The complementarity conditions
of this problem are stated as:
0 ≤ Linecapl ∓
∑
i
PTDFi,l(
∑
f,k
yf,i,k,t − d1i − d2i,t) ⊥ µ±l,t ≥ 0 ∀ l, t (3)
Condition (3) states that one of the dual variables µ+l,t and µ
−
l,t is positive when the flowgate
l is congested in time segment t.
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3.2.2 Generators maximize profits.
Generators maximize hourly profits within their generation capacity constraints in each time
segment t:
Max
∑
i,k
pi,t · yf,i,k,t −
∑
i,k
(cf,i,k + ek · λ) · yf,i,k,t s.t. (4)
0 ≤ Xf,i,k + xf,i,k − yf,i,k,t (νf,i,k,t) ∀ f, i, k, t (5)
Generators operate both existing Xf,i,k and new xf,i,k capacities to produce a non-negative
quantity of electricity yf,i,k,t as indicated by constraint (5). This condition is matched with
the dual variable νf,i,k,t representing the scarcity rent, i.e. the marginal capacity value, of both
new and old power plants. This optimization problem can be transformed in complementarity
conditions as indicated below:
0 ≤ Xf,i,k + xf,i,k − yf,i,k,t ⊥ νf,i,k,t ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k, t (6)
0 ≤ cf,i,k + ek · λ+ νf,i,k,t − pi,t ⊥ yf,i,k,t ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k, t (7)
Condition (6) restates constraint (5) and indicates that the scarcity rent νf,i,k,t is positive
when the total available capacity (Xf,i,k + xf,i,k) is fully utilized. Condition (7) summarizes
the generator’s optimal behaviour and expresses production efficiency: the electricity price
pi,t recovers the fuel (cf,i,k) and the emission opportunity (ek ·λ) costs as well as the scarcity
rent (νf,i,k,t) whenever generation (yf,i,k,t) is positive.
3.2.3 Investors maximize profits.
As already explained in Section 2, we suppose that investors maximize profits by building
new generation capacities xf,i,k and leasing them to generators at price νf,i,k,t in each time
segment t. This is expressed as follows:
Max
∑
i,k
(
∑
t
τt · νi,k,t − If,i,k) · xf,i,k (8)
Revenues accrue from the difference between the unitary marginal value of the new capacity
νf,i,k,t and the investment cost If,i,k. Variable xf,i,k is non-negative. Condition (9) states the
complementary version of this problem.
0 ≤ If,i,k −
∑
t
τt · νf,i,k,t ⊥ xf,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k (9)
3.2.4 N-EIIs and EIIs maximize surpluses.
N-EIIs’ hourly surplus maximization problem in time segment t and zone i is defined as:
Max.
∫ d2i,t
0
P 2i,t(ξ)dξ − pi,t · d2i,t (10)
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Taking into account that P 2i,t(d
2
i,t) = pi,t and after replacing P
2
i,t(d
2
i,t) by its affine expression,
it holds that:
pi,t = a2i,t − b2i,t · d2i,t ∀ i, t (11)
Recall that we assume a constant industrial electricity consumption over time. This implies
a slight modification of the EIIs’ model compared to the N-EIIs.
Max
∫ d1i
0
P 1i (ξ)dξ −
∑
t
τt · pi,t · d1i (12)
or after expressing the optimality condition and replacing the functions P 1i (ξ) by its affine
expression: ∑
t
τt · pi,t = a1i − b1i · d1i ∀ i (13)
The quantities of electricity consumed by N-EIIs (d2i,t) and by EIIs (d
1
i ) are non-negative.
Moreover, both consumer groups pay identical electricity prices pi.t.
3.2.5 Clearing of the energy market.
We assume an hourly balance of the energy market. According to the flowgate representation
of the network, this market clears at pit, the price set at the hub. This price depends on time
t. Equality (14) expresses this idea.∑
f,i,k
yf,i,k,t −
∑
i
d1t −
∑
i
d2i,t = 0 (pit) ∀ t (14)
pi,t = pit +
∑
l
PTDFi,l(−µ+l,t + µ−l,t) ∀ i, t (15)
The hub price pit can be considered as a floor price that after adding the transmission costs,
(−µ+l,t + µ−l,t) · PTDFi,l, gives the zonal marginal electricity prices pi,t paid by consumers as
indicated in condition (15). Note that zonal electricity prices are equal to the hub price when
there is no congestion.
3.2.6 Clearing of the emission market.
This reference model only considers the emissions of power plants. Since National Allocation
Plans (NAPs) refer to annual targets, we impose one emission constraint, with its associated
dual variable λ, representing the allowance price. The hourly emission cap E results from
the division of the annual power sectors NAPs by 8760, the yearly number of hours. The
emission constraint is defined as follows:
0 ≤ E −
∑
f,i,k,t
τt · ek · yf,i,k,t (λ) (16)
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Total hourly emissions are computed by multiplying the technology emission factor ek by
the hourly electricity production yf,i,k,t. Condition (17) is the complementarity of constraint
(16). It means that the allowance price λ is positive when the emission constraint is binding.
0 ≤ E −
∑
f,i,k,t
τt · ek · yf,i,k,t ⊥ λ ≥ 0 (17)
4 Properties of the Perfect Competition Model
The reference model extends the standard capacity expansion model and the associate peak
load pricing theory developed in the early days of electricity economics by including trans-
mission and emission markets. It is a convex problem as stated in Proposition 1.
4.1 Existence of Equilibrium
Proposition 1 The set of conditions (3), (6), (7), (9), (11), (13), (14), (15) and (17) are
the KKT conditions of a convex optimization problem. They have a convex solution set.
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
4.2 Windfall Profits and Losses
The model supposes a fixed amount of allowances, but purposely avoids discussing property
rights on these allowances. It is well known that free allowances allocated once for all irre-
spectively of agents’ decisions (as in the US acid rain program, but not in the EU-ETS) do
not distort these decisions. We assume that this is the case here and bypass questions of
distortion of incentives to invest or operate. Another issue is whether the allocation of free
allowances creates windfall profits or losses. The application of a new environmental regu-
lation changes the value of a firm’s assets therefore possibly justifying taxes and subsidies
(free allowances). We quantify this change by comparing the value of the firm’s assets before
and after the inception of the EU-ETS. For instance, a nuclear plant benefits from a CCGT
plant setting the electricity price in the ETS, while a coal plant loses because of its high
emission charges. This may justify taxing windfall profits in the former case and granting
free allowances in the latter. Propositions 2 and 3 shed some light on this issue. We look
at the question by referring to optimally adjusted generation systems as introduced in the
early theories of peak load pricing. Consider first a generation system developed without
carbon legislation. Introduce then an emission trading scheme and assume a certain fraction
of free allowances. The question is whether this creates profits or induces losses for the power
companies, either before or after they adjust capacity, to adapt to the new situation. We
state the following propositions.
Proposition 2 Suppose an optimally adjusted generation system when there is no carbon le-
gislation. The profits of investors are zero at the equilibrium solution. Suppose an optimally
adjusted generation system under an emission trading scheme. The profits of investors are
zero at the equilibrium solution if the operators of these generations capacities do not receive
free allowances.
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Proof: See Appendix 2. 
The introduction of a carbon legislation changes the value of its capacities leading to gains
or losses. These can be measured before or after the company adjust to this new situation
by investing in new equipments. We assess these changes in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose a generation system optimally adjusted in the absence of carbon
legislation. Introduce an emission trading scheme and assume that the generation system
adapts to this new legislation taking the generation structure developed without the ETS as
existing capacities. Let νCO2f,i,k,t be the marginal value in time segment t of capacity k, owned by
generator f located in zone i obtained under these conditions. The change of value of plant
(k, f, i) after the introduction of the ETS is:∑
t
τt · νCO2f,i,k,t − If,i,k
Proof: Appendix 3. 
The same formula applies to the change of value of the asset before adjustment of capacities,
but with the νCO2f,i,k,t computed with existing capacities and no investments.
5 Electricity Cost and Investments: Average Cost Pricing
Models
We now turn to models where electricity is sold to EIIs at average cost. Recall that we
distinguish two types of contracts that differ by their geographic expanse. A zonal contract is
one where the EIIs are charged the average cost of their zone: the price excludes transmission
costs between zones. A regional contract supposes a single average cost for all zones; the
price includes cross-border transmission costs. In this section, average cost models only deal
with the (indirect) electricity ETS induced costs, which EIIs complain most about. Because
average costs need to be auditable or at least credible for EIIs, we assume that their are
based on capacities dedicated by generators to EIIs, the rest of the capacity supplying N-
EIIs. Generators then sell at marginal cost to N-EIIs and at average cost to EIIs. We assume
that generators maximize the profit of selling electricity to N-EIIs (without exercising market
power) and minimize the cost of supplying EIIs. The structure of the transmission and
allowance markets remains unchanged. Also the investors’ problem is not modified.
5.1 Notation of the Average Cost Models
The parameters of the models are identical to those of Section 3.2. We list the variables.
Recall that EIIs’ variables do not depend on time, in contrast with those relative to N-EIIs.
We identify EIIs and N-EIIs’ variables respectively with “1” and “2”.
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• Variables
y1f,i,k; y
2
f,i,k,t Hourly generation by technology k run by generator f in zone i to
supply EIIs and N-EIIs (MWh);
X1f,i,k; X
2
f,i,k Existing capacity of technology k that generator f located in i dedi-
cates to EIIs and N-EIIs (MWh);
x1f,i,k; x
2
f,i,k New capacity of technology k that generator f located in i dedicates
to EIIs and N-EIIs (MWh);
ν1f,i,k; ν
2
f,i,k,t Marginal hourly value of capacity (scarcity rent) of technology k used
by generator f in zone i allocated to EIIs and N-EIIs (e/MWh);
νf,i,k Marginal hourly value of capacity of technology k used by generator f
in zone i (e/MWh). See below for the relation with ν1f,i,k and ν
2
f,i,k,t;
d1i ; d
t,2
i Hourly power consumption respectively by EIIs and N-EIIs located
in zone i (in MWh). N-EIIs’ consumption differs by season t ;
p1 Regional average cost price of electricity paid by EIIs (e/MWh).
This price is the sum of the regional production and allowance costs
pprod1 and of the average regional transmission cost ptrans1;
p1i Zonal average cost price of electricity paid by EIIs (e/MWh). This
price in the sum of the regional production and allowance costs in
the zone i;
pt,2i Zonal marginal price paid by N-EIIs in each season t (e/MWh);
pi2t Electricity price at the hub in each time segment t for N-EIIs
(e/MWh);
θ1 Marginal cost at the hub of the electricity generated by capacities
dedicated to EIIs (e/MWh). This variable intervenes in the regional
average cost price model;
θ1i Marginal cost at the zone i of the electricity generated by capacities
dedicated to EIIs (e/MWh). These variables intervene in the zonal
average cost price model.
5.2 Regional Average Cost Pricing Model
The regional average cost pricing arrangement assumes that EIIs form a power purchase
consortium that buys electricity produced by dedicated plants located in different zones of
the network through long-term contracts. This is akin to the French Exeltium consortium.
There is no change in the organization of the N-EIIs’ problem with respect to the reference
model.
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5.2.1 Transmission market and TSO’s profit maximization.
The TSO’s model is similar to the one presented in Section 3.2. We state the complementarity
conditions:
0 ≤ Linecapl ∓
∑
i
PTDFi,l(
∑
f,k
y1f,i,k +
∑
f,k
y2f,i,k,t − d1i − d2i,t) ⊥ µ±l,t ≥ 0 ∀ l, t (18)
obtained from condition (3) after replacing the variable yf,i,k,t respectively by y1f,i,k and y
2
f,i,k,t
to account for the segmentation of the market into EIIs and N-EIIs.
5.2.2 Generators maximize profits from supplying the N-EIIs.
The N-EII sector is still supplied at marginal cost. As in Section 3.2, generators maximize
the profits accruing from supplying N-EIIs in each time segment t at the prevailing prices p2i,t
.
Max
∑
i,k
p2i,t · y2f,i,k,t −
∑
i,k
(cf,i,k + ek · λ) · y2f,i,k,t s.t. (19)
0 ≤ X2f,i,k + x2f,i,k − y2f,i,k,t (ν2f,i,k,t) ∀ f, i, k, t (20)
Relation (20) states that generators operate dedicated existing (X2f,i,k) and new (x
2
f,i,k) ca-
pacities to supply N-EIIs. Again, y2f,i,k,t, X
2
f,i,k and x
2
f,i,k are non-negative variables. The
complementarity conditions become:
0 ≤ cf,i,k + ek · λ+ ν2f,i,k,t − p2i,t⊥ y2f,i,k,t ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k, t (21)
0 ≤ X2f,i,k + x2f,i,k − y2f,i,k,t⊥ ν2f,i,k,t ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k, t (22)
As condition (7), condition (21) states that, in perfect competition, the marginal electricity
price p2i,t equals the sum of the marginal production (cf,i,k), emission (ek · λ) and capacity
(ν2f,i,k,t) costs when generation (y
2
f,i,k,t) is positive.
5.2.3 Generators minimize the cost of supplying EIIs.
A different modeling applies for generation and supply to the EIIs’ segment. Average cost
pricing allows one to retain production efficiency, but sacrifices allocation efficiency. Gen-
erators no longer maximize profits from selling at marginal cost, but they still minimize
generation and supply (here transmission) costs. Their problem is stated as follows:
Min
∑
f,i
(cf,i,k + ek · λ) · y1f,i,k − (
∑
i,l,t
τt · PTDFi,l(−µt,+l + µt,−l )) · (
∑
k
y1f,i,k − d1i ) (23)
s.t.
0 ≤ X1f,i,k + x1f,i,k − y1f,i,k (ν1f,i,k) ∀ f, i, k (24)∑
f,i
y1f,i −
∑
i
d1i = 0 (θ
1) (25)
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The first term (cf,i,k + ek · λ) of this objective function is the sum of the production and
emission costs; the second term, (
∑
i,l,t τt · PTDFi,l(−µt,+l + µt,−l )), collects the congestion
costs caused by sales from generators to EIIs. Conditions (24) and (25) state the capacity
constraints and the energy balance of the consortium on the EIIs’ market. As before, variables
y1f,i,k, X
1
f,i,k and x
1
f,i,k are non-negative.
The KKT conditions of this problem are:
0 ≤ cf,i,k + ek · λ+ ν1f,i,k − θ1 − (
∑
t,l
τt · PTDFi,l(−µt,+l + µt,−l ))⊥ y1f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k (26)
0 ≤ X1f,i,k + x1f,i,k − y1f,i,k⊥ ν1f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k (27)
When condition (26) is binding, generator f supplies EIIs with a positive quantity of elec-
tricity y1f,i,k. This implies that the sum of the marginal production (cf,i,k), emission (ek · λ)
and capacity (ν1f,i,k) costs equals the value (θ
1 +
∑
t,l τt · PTDFi,l(−µt,+l + µt,−l )). The vari-
able θ1 is the marginal electricity price that EIIs would pay at the hub in a hypothetical
perfectly competitive regime. It is the analogue of the pi2t in the N-EIIs’ problem and appears
as the complementarity variable of the energy balance in the EIIs’ market (see condition
(25)). In fact, the EIIs’ model embeds both an “accounting” and an “economic” electric-
ity prices. The former is the average cost price p1, which EIIs effectively pay to generators
and the TSO. The second is the transfer price θ1 that guarantees the efficiency of elec-
tricity production and capacity allocation between the two consumer groups. One indeed
observes in condition (26) that the marginal price θ1 adds to the weighted congestion costs
(
∑
i,l,t τt · PTDFi,l(−µt,+l + µt,−l )) to arrive at a marginal cost price similar to p2i,t in the
N-EIIs’ model.
Finally, condition (27) is the capacity constraint. The quantity of electricity that gen-
erators produce for EIIs (y1f,i,k) cannot exceed the dedicated capacity (X
1
f,i,k + x
1
f,i,m). The
scarcity rent (ν1f,i,k) paired with this condition is positive only when power plant (f, i, k) is
at capacity.
5.2.4 Efficiency of the capacity allocation between N-EIIs and EIIs.
Capacities are endogenously allocated between EIIs and N-EIIs. We make this allocation
efficient by equalizing the marginal values of the capacities dedicated to the two consumer
groups. This is stated in the following complementarity conditions that we further analyze
in the next section:
0 ≤ Xf,i,k −X1f,i,k −X2f,i,k⊥ νf,i,m ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k (28)
0 ≤ X2f,i,k + x2f,i,k − y2f,i,k,t⊥ ν2f,i,k,t ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, t, k (29)
0 ≤ X1f,i,k + x1f,i,k − y1f,i,k⊥ ν1f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k (30)
0 ≤ νf,i,k −
∑
t
τt · ν2f,i,k,t⊥ X2f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k (31)
0 ≤ νf,i,k − ν1f,i,k⊥ X1f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k (32)
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Condition (28) is the global constraint on existing capacities. It imposes that the sum of
capacities X2f,i,k and X
1
f,i,k, respectively reserved for N-EIIs and EIIs does not exceed the
existing capacity Xf,i,k (Xf,i,k is a parameter). The variable νf,i,m, pairing (28), is the global
scarcity rent. Constraints (29) and (30) set the marginal values of the capacities in the
two market segments. They were stated before as (22) and (27) and are recalled here as
we gather all relations relevant to the capacity allocation mechanism. Conditions (31) and
(32) equalize νf,i,k to ν1f,i,k and the weighted sum of ν
2
f,i,k,t. As will be stated in the next
section, this guarantees production efficiency by forcing the equality of the marginal values
of capacity of the consumer segments, irrespectively of the fact that the different electricity
pricing schemes distort allocative efficiency.
5.2.5 Investors maximize profits.
Investors maximize their profits by building new plants and leasing existing and new capacities
to generators in each time segment t. Their problem reflects the split of capacity between
the two consumer groups:
Max
∑
i,k
(
∑
t
τt · ν2i,k,t − If,i,k) · x2f,i,k +
∑
i,k
(ν1i,k,t − If,i,k) · x1f,i,k (33)
The complementarity conditions are as follows:
0 ≤ If,i,k −
∑
t
τt · ν2f,i,k,t ⊥ x2f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k (34)
0 ≤ If,i,k − ν1f,i,k ⊥ x1f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k (35)
5.2.6 N-EIIs and EIIs maximize surpluses.
As in the reference case, both N-EIIs and EIIs maximize their surpluses. The formulation
of the N-EIIs’ problem is slightly adapted from Section 3.2.4 to new situation. The EIIs’
problem becomes:
Max
∫ d1i
0
P 1i (ξ)dξ − p1 · d1i or p1 = a1i − b1i · d1i ∀ i (36)
where the weighted sum of the marginal electricity prices pt,i in condition (13) of Section
3.2.4 is now substituted with p1, the regional average cost price that represents the average
production, emission and transmission costs of the EIIs’ dedicated power units (see equality
(41)).
5.2.7 Clearing of the energy market.
The separation of the market into its EIIs and N-EIIs’ segments requires two market clearings.
Conditions (37) and (38) respectively state the energy balance and the formation of the zonal
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marginal cost electricity prices on the N-EIIs segment. The mechanism is as in Section 3.2.5,
but is here restricted to the sole N-EIIs’ sector.∑
f,i,k
y2f,i,k,t −
∑
i
d2i,t = 0 (pi
2
t ) ∀ t (37)
p2i,t = pi
2
t +
∑
l
PTDFi,l(−µt,+l + µt,−l ) ∀ i, l (38)
As announced in Section 5.2.3 the EIIs’ market involves an “economic” transfer price θ1
and an “accounting” average cost price p1 that we now define. Condition (39) computes the
average production cost pprod1: it accounts for the annual fuel, emission and capacity costs
of the existing (X1f,i,k) and new (x
1
f,i,k) power plants assigned to EIIs. The average congestion
cost is computed in equality (40). The sum of the average production and transmission costs
results in the total average price p1 paid by EIIs (41).
pprod1 =
∑
f,i,k y
1
f,i,k · (cf,i,k + ek · λ) +
∑
f,i,k If,i,k · (X1f,i,k + x1f,i,k)∑
i d
1
i
(39)
ptrans1 =
∑
i,l,t(τt · PTDFi,l(µt,+l − µt,−l ) · (
∑
f,k y
1
f,i,k − d1i ))∑
i d
1
i
(40)
p1 = pprod1 + ptrans1 (41)
The “economic” transfer price θ1 only plays a technical role that will appear in the proof of
some propositions in Section 6. It suffices to note here that it is paired with condition (42)
that is identical to (25) of Section 5.2.3.∑
f,i,k
y1f,i,k −
∑
i
d1i = 0 (θ
1) (42)
5.2.8 Clearing of the emission market.
As condition (17) in Section 3.2.6, the emission constraint only accounts for the CO2 of the
power sector, here expressed as the global contribution for supplying both EIIs (
∑
f,i,k ek ·
y1f,i,k) and N-EIIs (
∑
t,f,i,k ek · y2f,i,k,t). Recall that, as the rest of the model, the emission cap
E is expressed in hour. We directly report the complementarity form.
0 ≤ E − (
∑
f,i,k
ek · y1f,i,k +
∑
t,f,i,k
τt · ek · y2f,i,k,t)⊥ λ ≥ 0 (43)
5.3 Zonal Average Cost Pricing Model
We now turn to an alternative model where one assumes that EIIs pay a zonal average cost
price. The structure of the model is similar to the one of the previous section. We therefore
limit the presentation to the required small changes of the EIIs’ model.
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5.3.1 Transmission market and TSO’s profit maximization.
Because EIIs conclude contracts with local electricity producers, their demand no longer con-
tributes to the network congestion (this is the official fiction of the flowgate model discussed
in Europe) and therefore disappears from the TSO’s optimization problem. Complementarity
condition (44) replaces (18) of Section 5.2.1.
0 ≤ Linecapl ∓
∑
i
PTDFi,l(
∑
f,k
y2f,i,k,t − d2i,t) ⊥ µ±l,t ≥ 0 ∀ l, t (44)
5.3.2 Generators minimize the cost of supplying EIIs.
In contrast with the regional average cost pricing model where industries constitute a single
purchasing consortium, we here assume a purchasing consortium in each zone (the current
insufficient development of cross border trade in Europe makes this view quite realistic).
Generators in each zone i therefore solve the following cost minimization problem:
Min
∑
i,k
(cf,i,k + ek · λ) · y1f,i,k s.t. (45)
0 ≤ X1f,i,k + x1f,i,k − y1f,i,k (ν1f,i,k) ∀ f, i, k (46)∑
f
y1f,i − d1i = 0 (θ1i ) ∀ i (47)
As in the regional average cost model, the variable θ1i represents an internal transfer price
among generators. In contrast with the regional model, it here depends on zone i. The
corresponding KKT condition becomes:
0 ≤ cf,i,k + ek · λ+ ν1f,i,k − θ1i⊥ y1f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k (48)
0 ≤ x1f,i,k − y1f,i,k⊥ ν1f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k (49)
to be added to the market balance (47).
5.3.3 N-EIIs and EIIs maximize surpluses.
The N-EIIs’ maximization problem obtains from Section 5.2.6 after substituting the regional
(p1) with the zonal (p1i ) average cost prices:
Max
∫ d1i
0
P 1i (ξ)dξ − p1i · d1i or p1i = a1i − b1i · d1i ∀ i (50)
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5.3.4 Clearing of the energy market.
The energy market clears for both market segments in each zone. The N-EIIs’ model remains
unchanged with respect to that presented in Section 5.2.8 and leads to the formation of the
marginal prices p2i . EIIs now buy at a zonal average cost price computed as follows:
p1i =
∑
f,k y
1
f,i,k · (cf,i,k + ek · λ) +
∑
f,k If,i,k · (X1f,i,k + x1f,i,k)
d1i
(51)
Finally, the clearing of the emission market, the endogenous allocation of existing and new
capacity to N-EIIs and EIIs, the investors as well as the generators maximization problems
are identical to those described in Section 5.2.
6 Properties of the Average Cost Pricing Models
The above models involve average cost prices and hence can no longer be formulated as
optimization problems. The relations (39), (40), (41) and (51), equating prices to average
costs respectively in the regional and the zonal average cost models, introduce non convexities.
The trivial, one plant and one consumer segment equilibrium model, exhibited in Figure 1
shows that the problem can have a multiplicity of isolated solutions or be infeasible. We try
to shed some light on this existence and multiplicity problem by resorting to arguments that
do not involve convexity. The discussion is conducted on the regional model, but also applies
to the zonal model.
While the overall model is non convex, it contains a useful convex sub-model. Consider
the relations obtained from the overall model by dropping the definition of the average cost
prices and the demand system of the EIIs, namely conditions (36), (39), (40) and (41). Taking
the demand of the EIIs as fixed and leaving the demand of the N-EIIs responsive to price,
we obtain a sub-model that we refer to as the partial average cost model. We first state the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 The partial average cost model is formed by the KKT conditions of a convex
optimization problem. It has a convex set of solutions.
Proof: See Appendix 5. 
6.1 Production Efficiency
A by-product of this proposition is that the allocation of generation capacity between EIIs
and N-EIIs is economically efficient and that the price θ1 and the time weighted average of
pi2t at the hub are equal. Before proving it, we introduce the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 Suppose the regional average cost model has an equilibrium. The EIIs’ scarcity
rent ν1f,i,k equals the time weighted sum of the N-EIIs’ scarcity rent ν
2
f,i,k,t.
Proof: This equality directly derives from (31) and (32). 
Proposition 4 and the Lemma imply the following corollaries:
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Corollary 1 Suppose the regional average cost model has an equilibrium. The allocation of
capacities between EIIs and N-EIIs is production efficient at equilibrium. Generation is also
efficient in the sense that θ1 and the time weighted average of pi2t are equal.
Proof: See Appendix 6. 
Corollary 2 Suppose the zonal average cost model has an equilibrium. The allocation of
capacities between EIIs and N-EIIs is production efficient at equilibrium. Generation is also
efficient in the sense that θ1i and the time weighted average of p
2
i,t are equal in each zone i.
Proof: See Appendix 7. 
6.2 Existence of Equilibrium
In order to proceed further in the analysis of existence and multiplicity of equilibrium, we
slightly modify the current set up to endow it with additional continuity properties. We first
assume that the solution of the partial average cost model is unique. This is easily done by
making the short term cost functions of the generators strictly convex. This guarantees that
the solution of the partial average cost model is a continuous mapping of the vector of EIIs’
demands. Because total production and transmission costs are computed on the basis of this
solution using algebric operations, the partial average cost model also defines a continuous
mapping from EIIs’ demand into EIIs induced production and transmission costs. We also
slightly modify the definition of the average cost price by capping it at a level that is higher
than the largest intercept of the demand functions of the EIIs (see Figure 2 in Appendix 4).
This is done by restating the average cost price as p1
′
and assuming that its value is equal
to min[p1, cap], namely the minimum between the actual p1 and the imposed cap. Note that
this modification is not innocuous; it implies that we accept that generators do not cover
their fixed costs when demand is too low (that is when p1
′
is effectively smaller than p1).
We argue next that this adaptation of the price is quite realistic, but first state an existence
result. We refer to the models with modified average cost price as the modified models (see
Appendix 4).
Consider the set
∏
i[0, a
1
i /b
1
i ] of feasible demand vectors of EIIs. As just discussed, the
solution of the partial average cost model is a continuous mapping of the vector of EIIs’
demands into the production and transmission costs incurred by EIIs. The combination of
the capped average cost price, defined above, and of the demand relation (36) constitutes a
mapping from the production and transmission costs of EIIs into the set of EIIs’ demand
vectors. The combination of these two mappings is a continuous mapping from the set of
feasible EIIs’ demand vectors into itself. We can then state the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The modified average cost model has an equilibrium.
Proof: The proof is a direct application of Brower’s fixed point theorem with a continuous
mapping from
∏
i[0, a
1
i /b
1
i ] into itself. 
It remains to explain the role of the modification of the pricing mapping. As can be
seen from Figure 2, an average cost pricing model can be infeasible when the average cost
price is too high for the demand. In practice, this means that the demand vanishes (since
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there is no feasible demand) and that the generator is left with stranded assets (assets for
which it cannot recover the cost). This is exactly what the modified average pricing scheme
represents.
6.3 Numerical Considerations
The two average cost models are non-convex and hence typically more difficult to solve than
convex problems. Particular difficulties arise here because of the possibility that there is no
positive solution for some zonal EIIs. This is so when capacity charges contribute too much to
the average cost price, an occurrence that we cannot identify with certainty in a non-convex
equilibrium model. We try to mitigate these numerical difficulties by solving the average cost
based models as a sequence of two different sub-problems. We first solve a preliminary model
by simulating a perfectly competitive power market where, like in the average cost pricing
models, EIIs and N-EIIs are supplied by dedicated capacities, but both buy electricity at the
marginal cost price. This preliminary problem is convex and has always a solution that is
used as starting point for solving the average cost pricing problem. This procedure is applied
to the two average cost pricing models. These non-convex models may have either no or
multiple positive solutions. The empirical results of our simulations (see Oggioni and Smeers
[4], [5]) show that, apart from one case, all models have positive solutions, even though
possibly multiple. These disjoint solutions are detected by changing the starting point of the
algorithm. We shall return to this point in Section 8.
Another important observation is that the regional average cost pricing model is more
complex than the zonal average cost problem. Specifically, the regional average cost price
model involves the sum of the average production (variables and capacity) costs of the dedi-
cated units and the average transmission charges paid by EIIs for their use of the congested
transmission grid. Production costs include only primal variables. The computation of the
transmission cost involves the product of primal (injection and withdrawals in
∑
f,k y
1
f,i,k−d1i ),
and dual variables (µt,+l , µ
t,−
l ), corresponding to the marginal congestion costs (see, for in-
stance, condition (40)). The absence of the average transmission charges should simplify the
zonal average cost problem. Surprisingly we did not notice any difference in the solution of
the two types of problems.
6.4 Windfall Profits and Losses
As for the reference model we do not discuss the possibility of distorted incentives due to
decision dependent allocations of free allowances. Our concern remains focused on the iden-
tification of windfall profits or losses on existing assets. We do not repeat the justification of
this concern here and simply state some propositions that extend the results already found
in the reference model.
Proposition 6 Suppose an optimally adjusted generation system under an emission trading
scheme where EIIs are priced at average generation, transmission and generation costs. The
profits of investors are zero at the equilibrium solution if the operators of these generation
capacities do not receive free allowances.
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Proof: The proof is identical to the one of Proposition 2 for the profits of N-EIIs. The absence
of profit on investments for EIIs results from the average cost pricing. 
Suppose now a system optimally adjusted under the assumption of no carbon legislation
(zonal marginal price). The introduction of a carbon legislation together with average cost
based contracts changes the value of generation capacities as stated in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 7 Suppose an optimally adjusted generation system when there is no carbon
legislation and one applies zonal marginal prices. Let X0f,i,k be the capital stock obtained as
the solution of that equilibrium model. Introduce an emission trading scheme and assume
that the generation system adapts to this new legislation taking X0f,i,k as existing capacities.
Let
∑
t τtν
CO2
f,i,k,t be the weighted marginal values of capacity k, located in i, obtained by solving
the average cost model (regional or zonal). The change of value of this plant (k, f, i) due to
the introduction of the ETS is: ∑
t
τt · νCO2f,i,k,t − If,i,k
Proof: The proof is identical to the one of Proposition 3. 
7 Electricity and Carbon Costs
We now assume that EIIs participate to the ETS and model both their carbon (direct) and
electricity (indirect) costs. Allowances intervene in EIIs’ profit and loss as a cost or subsidy
depending on the (still to be decided) European policy on free allowances. Full auctioning
imposes costs, free allowances provide subsidies. We model both policies and let the carbon
component appear in the new formulation of the EIIs’ demand either as an additional cost or a
subsidy. A first scenario supposes full auctioning and hence considers carbon as a cost that we
obtain by multiplying the endogenous allowance price by the EIIs’ emission factors. A second
scenario assumes some free allowances and represents the subsidy accruing from them as the
product of the allowance price and an allowance factor (to be distinguished from the emission
factor) that reflects the gap between the EIIs’ emissions and the amount of free allowances.
We calibrate this coefficient on the basis of the Community Independent Transaction Log
(for the emission), Eurostat [2] and UCTE [10] (for electricity consumption) websites. We
chose 2005 data since, in this year, emissions have been recognized to be independently and
consistently verified.
We model the ETS induced carbon and electricity costs on the basis of the equilibrium
problems presented in Sections 3 and 5 that we modify as described below. Perfect com-
petition constitutes again the reference counterfactual for assessing the regional and zonal
average costs pricing models. We introduce two features with respect to sections 3 and 5.
One is a straightforward modification of the emission constraint that accounts for EIIs emis-
sions. The second change is less trivial and described in the following subsection. Additional
information and results of these models are provided in a companion paper (Oggioni and
Smeers [5]).
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7.1 Modeling the Electricity and Carbon Costs
This section offers a method for embedding the impact of both the electricity price and carbon
costs in the electricity demand of the EIIs. It relies on simplifying assumptions that substitute
the lack of information on the industrial processes of these consumers. We assume that
emissions are proportional to production, which is itself proportional to power consumption
(linear technology). Global emissions are then determined by multiplying electricity demand
by an emission factor that, because of the lack of information, we compute on an aggregated
basis. Specifically, we distinguish emission factors by country, but not by production sector.
Sectoral data would relieve this restriction. These emission factors are obtained by dividing
the EIIs’ 2005 emissions (provided by the Community Independent Transaction Log) by the
EIIs’ annual reference demand that we compute on the basis of data available on the Eurostat
[2] and UCTE [10] websites.
Let pi denote the profit function of the aggregate industrial sector. It is defined as:
pi = py · y − pe · e− po · o− pco2 · co2 (52)
where y is the total output sold at price py. To produce y, industries consume non electricity
inputs o and electricity e that they buy at prices po and pe respectively. Industries also face
a price pco2 for each allowance. The total environmental cost is the product of that price and
the net purchase of allowances, let co2, that is, the difference between the emissions and the
free allowances.
We make the important policy assumption that free allowances are granted proportionally
to production (according to a benchmarking method) and the technological assumption that
the amount of electricity e, allowances co2 and input o depend on production as follows: (1)
e = α · y; (2) co2 = (β − γ) · y and (3) o = ϕ(y). Note that α and β are two technical
parameters that respectively represent the electricity consumption and the emission factor
per unit of output y; γ is a policy parameter defining the number of free allowances received
per unit of output and, finally, ϕ(y) is the consumption of non electricity input as a function
of the output y. By allowing for a slightly more general treatment of the consumption of non
electricity input ϕ(y), we can write (52) as a function of the sole output y and obtain:
pi(y) = py · y − pe · α · y − pco2 · (β − γ) · y − po · ϕ(y) (53)
A first step towards the modified industrial demand of electricity obtains by first computing
the first order condition of (53) with respect to y:
∂pi
∂y
= py − pe · α− pco2 · (β − γ)− po · ϕ′(y) = 0 (54)
With the objective to separately identifying the electricity price (pe), which measures the
indirect ETS cost, and the allowance price (pco2) which determines the direct carbon cost,
we re-write condition (54) as follows:
pe · α+ pco2 · (β − γ) = py − po · ϕ
′
(y) (55)
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Dividing by α on the left and right hand side of equation (55), one gets:
pe + pco2 · (
β − γ
α
) =
1
α
[
py − po · ϕ′(y)
]
(56)
which is akin to a demand function: the left hand side is a combination in fixed proportion
of the electricity and allowance prices (e/MWh), while the right hand side is only a function
of the output of the firm (the price of the output is fixed in this partial equilibrium model).
Because we are assuming linear demand functions throughout, we now impose the particular
functional form ϕ
′
(y) = a+ b · y and write:
pe + pco2 · (
β − γ
α
) =
1
α
[py − po · (a+ b · y)] (57)
Using the relation e = α · y, we substitute y in (57) and obtain:
pe + pco2 · (
β − γ
α
) = py
1
α
− po a
α
− po b
α
e (58)
By setting A = py 1α − po aα and B = po bα , we have:
pe + pco2 · (
β − γ
α
) = A−Be (59)
Equation (59) represents the inverted industrial demand of electricity, where the electricity
consumption e depends on electricity price pe and carbon component pco2 · (β−γα ). This
representation of the demand function allows for the modeling of different allowance allocation
methods. In the full grandfathering case β = γ and the carbon component does not affect
EIIs’ power consumption. In contrast, when allowances are fully auctioned, the factor γ = 0
and the carbon component becomes βα , which is also taken as the emission factor of EIIs. All
possible intermediate allowance allocation scenarios are easily defined by imposing β 6= γ.
The EIIs’ demand for allowances is:
allowance demand =
β − γ
α
· e
At this stage of the decision process, both full auctioning and partial free allowances to
EIIs are compatible with the proposed ETS Directive for the period 2013-2020. Note that
we assume full auctioning in the power sector.
7.2 Implied Modifications of the Model
The inclusion of the carbon component in the industrial electricity demand modifies EIIs’
behavior and requires a slight change of formulation in the models in Sections 3 and 5.
Adopting the notation of the previous sections where the allowance price pco2 is equal to
λ, and the industrial electricity demand e is d1i , the EIIs’ surplus maximization problem
becomes:
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• EIIs maximize their surplus
Max
∫ d1i
0
P 1i (ξ)dξ −
∑
t
τt · pi,t · d1i − λ ·
β − γ
α
· d1i (60)
or: ∑
t
τt · pi,t + λ · β − γ
α
= a1i − b1i · d1i (d1i ) ∀ i (61)
This optimization problem applies to the reference model, but can be easily adapted to the
regional and the zonal average cost models by replacing the marginal electricity price pi,t
respectively with p1 and p1i .
• Clearing of the emission market
We also modify the emission constraint as follows:
0 ≤ E − (
∑
t,f,i,k
τt · ek · yf,i,k,t + β
α
· d1i )⊥ λ ≥ 0 (62)
where the hourly cap E now also includes industrial emissions and the term βα · d1i represents
the hourly emissions of the industrial sector. This emission constraint extends condition (17)
of the reference model in Section 3. It is readily adapted to the average cost pricing models
by substituting the variable yf,i,k,t with y1f,i,k,t and y
2
f,i,k,t appearing in the capacity splitting
of those models.
8 Mathematical Analysis of the Results
Oggioni and Smeers [4] and [5] offer an extensive discussion of the type of policy results
obtained with these models. We here comment on some numerical aspects. As already
mentioned the average cost pricing models are non-convex and can have multiple solutions
or be infeasible. We explained in Section 6 how one can in principle remove infeasibility by
closing some industrial activities and possibly stranding generation capacities. Except in one
case, our simulations always found feasible models. We first discuss these feasible cases.
Most case studies conducted in Oggioni and Smeers [4]and [5] conclude with feasible
models, but reveal some non-convexity effect. As already mentioned, it is sometimes necessary
to resort to a two stages approach where one first solves the perfect competition model in
order to get a starting point for the average cost model. PATH would not find a solution
without this good starting point. One also finds that different starting points can lead to
different capacity allocation between EIIs and N-EIIs. Notwithstanding these problems, the
results are stable in the sense that perturbations of the model lead to globally similar policy
effects. For instance and of particular relevance, modifying the assumption of EIIs’ price
elasticity smoothly changes the total capacity allocated to EIIs (this capacity determines the
electricity price to EIIs) even though the details of this allocation can change (shift between
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new and existing capacities in the allocation). Finally, although the regional average cost
price model is in principle more complex because of the combination of primal and dual
variables in the transmission cost component, we do not encounter particular problems in
case studies conducted with that model.
We failed to solve one problem among the many reported in Oggioni and Smeers [5].
It is impossible with today’s knowledge to algorithmically conclude to the infeasibility of a
non-convex equilibrium model as it can also be a failure of the algorithm. This infeasible
case is a zonal average cost model where EIIs have to bear both the electricity and the full
CO2 costs (full auctioning). Sensitivity analysis however revealed that a slight relaxation of
full auctioning by the granting of some free allowances to EIIs made the model feasible. This
suggests that full auctioning effectively made the model infeasible and EIIs could not manage
both the electricity and carbon costs.
9 Conclusion
The restructuring of the electricity industry has generated an extensive literature on market
simulation models. A lot of attention was devoted to studying the impact of different market
architectures and structures with particular emphasis devoted to the exercise of market power.
The problem taken up in this paper is different and we believe new: it requires a shift of
paradigm away from a perfect competition system to an organization of the market where
a different pricing regime is introduced for a certain class of consumers, in this case, the
Electricity Intensive Industries. These industries almost universally complain about their
being offered PX or PX driven prices that they find both too high and too volatile. They
ask for average cost based contracts that they see as more stable and less expensive because
not based on marginal costs. We model this claim by constructing a model of the electricity
market with the demand sector segmented in two parts. EIIs are offered average cost based
contracts while the rest of the market remains supplied at PX based prices (or time averages
of PX based prices). We consider two types of average cost contracts that differ by their
geographic expanse. One assumes a single regional price; the other supposes several zonal
prices; the rest of the market is supplied at marginal cost. While these models are non-
convex, they perform surprisingly smoothly at least for the cases studied in this project. The
results of these models are presented in companion papers (Oggioni and Smeers [4], [5]); they
are also interesting in terms of policy: average cost based contracts can indeed mitigate the
impact of the ETS, but they remain far from removing it. The implementation of this remedy
is also complicated by the differences of energy policies among EU Member States. Models
need to rely on reliable data in order to be credible. This is where shortcomings are most
significant. While there is a lot of discussion on the problem of carbon leakage, one finds
very little empirical basis to construct a truly reliable prospective study of the problem (see
Reinaud [7], [8] as studies of the current situation).
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the following maximization problem:
Max
∫ d1i
0
P 1i (ξ)dξ +
∑
t
τt
∫ d2i,t
0
P 2i,t(ξ)dξ −
∑
f,i,k
cf,i,k · yf,i,k,t
−∑
f,i,k
If,i,k · xf,i,k
s.t.
0 ≤ Xf,i,k + xf,i,k − yf,i,k,t (τtνf,i,k,t) ∀ f, i, k, t
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∑
f,i,k
yf,i,k,t −
∑
i
d1i −
∑
i
d2i,t = 0 (τtpit) ∀ t
−Linecapl ≤
∑
i
PTDFi,l(
∑
f,k
yf,i,k,t − d1i − d2i,t) ≤ Linecapl (τtµ±l,t) ∀l, t
0 ≤ E −
∑
f,i,k,t
τt · ek · yf,i,k,t (λ)
0 ≤ yf,i,k,t, xf,i,k, d2i,t, d1i ∀ f, i, k, t
The objective function is the difference between a concave function (the consumers’ wil-
lingness to pay
∑
t τt
∫ d2i,t
0 P
2
i,t(ξ)dξ and
∫ d1i
0 P
1
i (ξ)dξ)) and linear functions representing the
generators’ operating and investment costs (
∑
t τt
∑
f,i,k cf,i,k · yf,i,k,t and
∑
f,i,k If,i,k · xf,i,k).
All constraints are linear. This means that the problem is convex. The solution set is then
also convex. The KKT conditions of a convex problem suffice to characterize its global
optimal solutions. We derive these conditions taking into account the non-negativity of these
variables and show that they reproduce the set of complementarity conditions.
• Derivative w.r.t. variable yf,i,k,t:
0 ≤ cf,i,k + ek · λ+ νf,i,k,t − pi,t ⊥ yf,i,k,t ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k, t
• Derivative w.r.t. variable xf,i,k:
0 ≤ If,i,k −
∑
t
τt · νf,i,k,t ⊥ xf,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ i, k
• Derivative w.r.t. variable d2i,t:
pi,t = a2i,t − b2i,t · d2i,t ∀ i, t
• Derivative w.r.t. variable d1i :
∑
t
τt · pi,t = a1i − b1i · d1i ∀ i
where pi,t is defined as pit +
∑
l PTDFi,l(−µ+l,t + µ−l,t). In addition, we consider the com-
plementarity conditions of the inequality constraints (generation and transmission capacity
and the emission constraints) and the clearing of the energy market:
0 ≤ Xf,i,k + xf,i,k − yf,i,k,t ⊥ νf,i,k,t ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k, t
0 ≤ Linecapl ∓
∑
i
PTDFi,l(
∑
f,k
yf,i,k,t − d1i − d2i,t) ⊥ µ±l,t ≥ 0 ∀ l, t
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0 ≤ E −
∑
f,i,k,t
τt · ek · yf,i,k,t ⊥ λ ≥ 0
∑
f,i,k
yf,i,k,t −
∑
i
d1i −
∑
i
d2i,t = 0 ∀ t

Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2: Relation (9) states that an investor (with positive variable xf,i,k)
makes zero profit on its investment after receiving the capacity rent νf,i,k,t from the plant’s
operator.
Relation (7) states that the operator of the plant, which produces a positive quantity of
electricity yf,i,k,t and receives the electricity price pi,t, makes zero profit after deducting the
fuel cost (parameter cf,i,k), the allowance cost (variable ek · λ) and paying the rent (νf,i,k,t)
to the owner of the plant.
In conclusion, neither the investor nor the generator make any profit respectively from
investing in capacity and operating it after paying for its costs.

Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 3: Let X0f,i,k be the capacity of plant f, i, k obtained as part of the
solution of the equilibrium problem without ETS. Insert these X0f,i,k as existing capacities
Xf,i,k in relation (5) describing the maximization of the profit of the generator. Let νCO2f,i,k,t
be obtained in the solution of the ETS problem with these existing capacities.
Relation (6) states that νCO2f,i,k,t is the value received by the owner of capacity X
0
f,i,k from
the operator of the plant. Because the value of this capacity was If,i,k (parameter) when
it was invested before the inception of the ETS, the change of value of a unit capacity is
(
∑
tτt · νCO2i,k,t − If,i,k). Summing up over all capacities, the change of value of the assets of
firm f is equal to: ∑
k,i
X0f,i,t
∑
i,k
(
∑
t
τt · νCO2i,k,t − If,i,k)

Appendix 4: Observations on Average Cost Pricing System
Figure 1 illustrates that the non-convexity induced by the average cost price may lead either
to a multiplicity of solutions or to no solution. The downward sloping linear curve represents
the demand function. The hyperbolic curve represents an average cost price of the form KQ +C
where K is the fixed cost and C is the proportional cost. The latter curve represents the
price p1 in an average cost pricing system. The average cost price curve goes to infinity when
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Figure 1: Average Cost Price Curve p1
the quantity of electricity demanded is close to zero. By capping the average cost pricing
curve, we obtain a new average cost price curve that we denote as p1
′
as depicted in Figure 2.
The price is now min[p1, cap], which guarantees a solution (0, cap) to the average cost based
model, where 0 is the quantity of electricity demanded and cap is the price limit imposed.
Figure 2: Capped Average Cost Price Curve p1
′
Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 4: The optimization problem we are looking for is as follows:
Max
∑
t
τt
∫ d2i,t
0
P 2i,t(ξ)dξ −
∑
i,k
cf,i,k · y2f,i,k,t
−∑
f,i,k
cf,i,k ·y1f,i,k−
∑
f,i,k
If,i,k ·(x2f,i,k+x1f,i,k)
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s.t.
0 ≤ Xf,i,k −X2f,i,k −X1f,i,k (νf,i,k) ∀ f, i, k
0 ≤ X2f,i,k + x2f,i,k − y2f,i,k,t (τtν2f,i,k,t) ∀ f, i, k, t
0 ≤ X1f,i,k + x1f,i,k − y1f,i,k (ν1f,i,k) ∀ f, i, k∑
f,i,k
y2f,i,k,t −
∑
i
d2i,t = 0 (τtpi
2
t ) ∀ t
∑
f,i,k
y1f,i,k −
∑
i
d1i = 0 (θ
1) ∀ t
−Linecapl ≤
∑
i
PTDFi,l(
∑
f,k
y2f,i,k,t − y1f,i,k − d2i,t − d1i ) ≤ Linecapl (τtµ±l,t) ∀ l, t
where d1i is now a parameter.
0 ≤ E −
∑
f,i,k,t
τt · ek · y2f,i,k,t −
∑
f,i,k
ek · y1f,i,k (λ)
0 ≤ y2f,i,k,t, x2f,i,k, X2f,i,k, d2i,t ∀ f, i, k, t
0 ≤ y1f,i,k, x1f,i,k, X1f,i,k ∀ f, i, k
The objective function is the difference between a concave function (the N-EIIs’ willingness
to pay
∑
t τt
∫ d2i,t
0 P
2
i,t(ξ)dξ)), and the sum of linear functions representing the generators’
operating cost (
∑
t,f,i,k τt · cf,i,k · y2f,i,k,t and
∑
f,i,k cf,i,k · y1f,i,k) and the investments cost
(
∑
f,i,k If,i,k · (x2f,i,k +x1f,i,k)). Again, all constraints are linear. This implies that the problem
is convex and hence also its solution set. Thanks to convexity, the KKT conditions are
necessary and sufficient to characterize a global optimal solution. They are indicated in the
following, noting that variables are non-negative:
• Derivative w.r.t. variable y2f,i,k,t:
0 ≤ cf,i,k + ek · λ+ ν2f,i,k,t − p2i,t ⊥ y2f,i,k,t ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k, t
• Derivative w.r.t. variable y1f,i,k:
0 ≤ cf,i,k + ek · λ+ ν1f,i,k − θ1 −
∑
t
τt ·
∑
l
PTDFi,l(−µ+l,t + µ−l,t) ⊥ y1f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k
• Derivative w.r.t. variable x2f,i,k:
0 ≤ If,i,k −
∑
t
τt · ν2f,i,k,t ⊥ x2f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ i, k
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• Derivative w.r.t. variable x1f,i,k:
0 ≤ If,i,k − ν1f,i,k ⊥ x1f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ i, k
• Derivative w.r.t. variable X2f,i,k:
0 ≤ νf,i,k −
∑
t
τtν
2
f,i,k,t ⊥ X2f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k
• Derivative w.r.t. variable X1f,i,k:
0 ≤ νf,i,k − ν1f,i,k ⊥ X1f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k
• Derivative w.r.t. variable d2i,t:
p2i,t = a
2
i,t − b2i,t · d2i,t ∀ t, i
where p2i,t is defined as pi
2
t +
∑
l PTDFi,l(−µ+l,t + µ−l,t). Like in proof 9, we consider the com-
plementarity conditions of the inequality constraints (generation and transmission capacity
and emission constraints) and the equality constraints defining the energy balance of the two
markets:
0 ≤ Xf,i,k −X2f,i,k −X1f,i,k ⊥ νf,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k
0 ≤ X2f,i,k + x2f,i,k − y2f,i,k,t ⊥ ν2f,i,k,t ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k, t
0 ≤ X1f,i,k + x1f,i,k − y1f,i,k ⊥ ν1f,i,k ≥ 0 ∀ f, i, k
0 ≤ Linecapl ∓
∑
i
PTDFi,l(
∑
f,k
y2f,i,k,t − y1f,i,k − d2i,t − d1i ) ⊥ µ±l,t ≥ 0 ∀ l, t
0 ≤ E −
∑
f,i,k,t
τt · ek · y2f,i,k,t −
∑
f,i,k
ek · y1f,i,k ⊥ λ ≥ 0
∑
f,i,k
y2f,i,k,t −
∑
i
d2i,t = 0 (p
2
i,t) ∀ t
∑
f,i,k
y1f,i,k −
∑
i
d1i = 0 (θ
1) ∀ t

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Appendix 6: Proof of Corollary 1
Proof of Corollary 1: The marginal electricity prices θ1 and p2i,t respectively match the EIIs’
and the NEIIs’ energy balance constraints (25) and (37). Constraint (26) shows that θ1,
increased by the transmission cost (
∑
t,l τt · PTDFi,l(−µt,+l + µt,−l )), equals the fuel cost
(parameter cf,j,k), the allowance cost (variable ek · λ) and the capacity cost (variable ν1f,i,k).
Constraint (21) shows that p2i,t equals the sum of the fuel cost (parameter cf,i,k), the allowance
cost (variable ek · λ) and the capacity cost (variable ν2f,i,k,t). Note that thanks to constraints
(31) and (32), variables ν1f,i,k and ν
2
f,i,k,t (weighted by hours) are equal (see Lemma 1). This
implies that θ1 +
∑
t,l τt · PTDFi,l(−µt,+l + µt,−l ) equals p2i,t. Since p2i,t results from the sum
of pi2t and the transmission costs
∑
l PTDFi,l(−µt,+l + µt,−l ), this implies that θ1 is equal to
the time average sum of pi2t . 
Appendix 7: Proof of Corollary 2
Proof of Corollary 2: The reasoning of this proof is as in Corollary 9, after comparing (47) and
(48) respectively with (37) and (21). Due the EIIs’ zonal electricity balance, θ1i in condition
(48) is equal to p2i,t in condition (21). 
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